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L Introduction
What do chief executive officers (CEOs) bargain for in their employment
contracts? If you read the labor law literature, you might think that these
executives did not have contracts. Prominent legal academics have claimed
that CEOs are at-will employees, just like rank-and-file workers.' If instead
you read the corporate law literature, you might think that CEOs get whatever
they want in their contracts. Leading legal academics have argued that
corporate boards are all too willing to give CEOs fat pay packages and
generous severance agreements because the directors are in the CEOs' back
pockets.2
For all of the ink that has been spilled about CEO contracting processes
and outcomes, however, no one has studied the contracts themselves. At the
most basic level, do executives have contracts? If so, what are their common
legal terms? Are they different from the employment arrangements of other
corporate employees? Do these contracts reflect strong CEOs dictating to
trembling directors whatever terms they want? Or are these agreements
negotiated documents exhibiting provisions that serve both parties' interests
well?
To answer these questions, we examined the key legal characteristics of
375 employment contracts between some of the largest 1500 public
corporations and their chief executive officers. We looked at the actual
language of these contracts and asked whether and in what ways CEO contracts
differ from standard employment contracts for other workers. Our data provide
some empirical answers to several common assertions or speculations in the
labor law literature about CEO contracts and shed light on corporate law
questions about whether these contracts are negotiated solely to suit the
1. See generally Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L.
REv. 947 (1984).
2. See John Core, Wayne Guay, & Randall Thomas, Is U.S. CEO Compensation
Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1158 (2005) (critiquing this
managerial power theory); see generally LucIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WrrHouT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF ExEcuTivE COMPENSATION (2004).
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preferences of CEOs or have provisions that also safeguard the employers'
interests.
We begin by giving an overview of the general characteristics of a CEO
employment contract and the process by which one is negotiated. This
discussion shows that while some terms of these agreements are boilerplate
language, there are intense negotiations over other terms. This background
helps put into context the empirical information gleaned from the contracts.
Turning then to the contracts and the labor law issues surrounding them,
we ask whether CEOs' employment contracts leave them as nothing more than
glorified at-will employees. We focus on five contracting issues: (1) the term
"just cause" that defines when an executive can be terminated involuntarily
with penalties; (2) the "good reason" termination clauses in the contract that
permit an executive to leave voluntarily without financial penalties; (3) the non-
competition clauses in the contract; (4) the use of arbitration clauses to resolve
contractual disputes; and (5) the contractual restrictions, if any, on the CEO's
selling stock options. We also discuss some of the lesser-known economic
terms of these contracts, including their length and the level of perquisites
given to CEOs.
We find much evidence that CEOs are not generally at-will employees.
First, with respect to termination provisions, we find that CEOs
overwhelmingly contract around the at-will default standard of termination. Of
375 contracts in our sample, only twenty-five expressly declare the contract to
be at-will. Thirteen contracts are in essence at-will as they give the CEO the
same rights if dismissed with or without cause. Most of the remaining contracts
(340) give the CEO greater rights if dismissed without cause. Even the
expressly declared at-will contracts tend not to be so. Of those twenty-five
contracts, twenty-four give the CEO greater rights for termination without
cause. Furthermore, 86.93% of the contracts are for a definite term of years.
This is quite different from the protections available to other workers, who are
generally at-will employees without contracts.
Examining the definition of "just cause" for terminating a CEO, we find
that the most commonly listed reasons are willful misconduct, moral turpitude,
failure to perform duties, breach of fiduciary duties, and gross misconduct. All
of these terms protect the CEO by sharply circumscribing the conduct for which
he or she can be terminated with financial penalties. Interestingly, provisions
that might protect the company's interests in actions against the CEO are much
less common. For example, only two contracts mention sexual harassment
(0.53%), thirteen mention incompetence (3.47%), and eighteen mention
substance abuse (4.80%).
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If we look at the other side of the coin, what happens when the CEO quits,
we find that CEOs give up some of their freedom to quit theirjobs by entering
into these contracts. If we look at the definition of "good reason" in these
contracts, we find that CEOs can terminate their employment for good reason
and generally get the same payments as if the company terminated them
without cause, if they are assigned duties inconsistent with their position, are
involuntarily relocated, or are not compensated. Termination without good
reason typically means a loss of severance benefits similar to that experienced
by a CEO terminated for cause.
In terms of clauses that protect the company, we find that about two-thirds
of the CEO employment contracts contain explicit do-not-compete clauses.
The most common length of these restrictions is two years (46.64%), while the
second most common is one year (31.62%). Almost three-quarters of these
clauses are triggered by any termination, whether with or without cause, or with
or without good reason. The length of these clauses correlates weakly with the
amount of severance pay awarded to a departing CEO. The presence of these
clauses suggests that companies get some benefit from continuing to pay
departing CEOs after their departure from the company. It also indicates that
these employment contracts are similar in this respect to severance agreements
offered to lower level employees.
We next examine arbitration clauses. While we leave for future work a
more detailed examination of these provisions, we do find that 41.60% of these
contracts include a clause requiring the parties to arbitrate rather than litigate
their disputes. This seems to indicate that CEOs, like other workers, bind
themselves to arbitrate contractual disputes.
We next briefly describe the debate in corporate law about CEOs'
influence over their pay. To shed some light on the power of CEOs in their
negotiations with their firms, we examined the 121 change-in-control
agreements included in the database compiled for our study. Our hypothesis
was that CEOs would be able to get highly favorable provisions in these
agreements because only an unwanted takeover of the firm would trigger their
provisions, and the acquiring company would at least initially be the one held
responsible for making any payments that the departing target company CEO
would receive. In other words, the change-in-control agreement's terms
illustrate what a CEO employment agreement might look like if CEO power
was unchecked by the board.
We compared the basic legal terms of these change-in-control agreements
with those contained in the employment contracts and found that, consistent
with our expectations, they gave CEOs more latitude to quit with good reason
than their regular employment agreements did. Relatively fewer change-in-
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control agreements included do-not-compete provisions than did CEO
employment contracts, and this difference was statistically significant. 3 If
change-in-control agreements contain the provisions that CEOs would like to
have in their employment contract, but are unable to get, then the differences
between the two types of contracts are strong evidence that CEO employment
arrangements are not as one-sided as some critics have claimed.
We also look at the use of contractual restrictions to stop CEOs from
engaging in transactions designed to eliminate all risks associated with stock
options. We believe that these employment contracts would be the natural
place where corporations could make CEOs promise not to unwind their stock
option positions by using derivative securities. Yet, none of the contracts in our
sample contains restrictions on hedging of a CEO's stock options, and only a
handful have limitations on their sale or pledge. While such restrictions may
appear in other agreements between the executive and the company, 4 we find
the absence of such provisions curious if corporations are serious about curbing
some of the reported derivative transactions involving stock options.
Looking at the economic terms of these contracts, we focus on the length
of the contract and the use of specific perquisites because these are not widely
disclosed in publicly available databases. We find that the most frequent length
of CEO contracts is three years and the second most common length is five
years. We also find that CEO employment contracts are quite specific about the
types and quantities of perquisites that will be given to them. Some of the more
lavish contracts include provisions for personal use of company aircraft,
country club memberships, company cars, executive loans, spousal travel at
company expense, and a host of other things. Given the very large amounts of
money that these executives already earn for their efforts, we are surprised that
companies are willing to offer them such a wide range of perks of this nature.
The contrast between these economic terms and those given to lower level
employees is apparent.
Part II of this Article describes the negotiation process for CEO
employment contracts. Part 11 describes our data. Part IV examines
employment law issues, and Part V focuses on corporate law questions.
3. See infra Part V.B (discussing change-in-control agreements).
4. Restrictions on the sale of options are sometimes found in separate contractual
agreements between the executive and the company, such as the company's stock option plan.
For example, CDI Corporation grants its CEO stock options in the employment agreement, but
the terms that govern these options are in a separate stock option agreement with the executive.
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II. Negotiating Executive Employment Contracts: A Stylized Overview5
When an existing corporate CEO retires, dies, or is fired, the company's
board must find a replacement. While the overall responsibility for the search
process will fall on the entire board, an ad hoc committee of the board of
directors generally runs the day-to-day management of the search. When the
board is considering only internal candidates or is extending the contract of the
incumbent CEO, the search committee will normally keep the process in-house,
and may engage a compensation consultant to advise it on the appropriate level
of compensation.
If it is considering outside candidates, the search committee will usually
retain an executive search firm (ESF), at least for the initial hire and contract
negotiations. The directors and the ESF will generate a group of up to ten to
fifteen potential candidates for the position, a virtual "dream team" in the
industry.6 Using their contacts and information generated by the ESF, the
search committee narrows the list down to a smaller set of generally three to
five finalists. The committee will then interview these candidates, often
secretly so that their current employers will not be aware of their potential
interest. The search committee may ask the ESF to generate additional
information about these finalists before making its final selection.
Once the search committee decides on its first choice, it will in most cases
offer that candidate the position. The principal economic terms of its offer will
be set forth in a term sheet.7 The term sheet, or its oral equivalent, will set forth
the proposed salary, target bonus, equity participation in the company (stock
options, restricted stock, and any long-term incentive plans), severance
package, change-in-control protections, benefits (health plans, supplemental
executive retirement plan, deferred compensation, etc.), and standard
perquisites. It would also cover such items as relocation expense payments, the
term of years for the contract, the renewal provisions for the contract, the duties
associated with the position, and the physical location for the executive. The
executive and the company's representatives then negotiate any changes to
these items with the ESF sometimes asked to act as an intermediary, subject to
5. This section is based largely on discussions with legal practitioners actively involved
in negotiating executive employment agreements, sometimes on behalf of companies, and
sometimes on the side of the executive. We have concealed their identities to preclude any
possible adverse use of this information.
6. RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR: THE IRRATIONAL QUEST
FOR CHARISMATIC CEOs 28 (2002).
7. The terms of the initial offer may be determined by the company's human resources
department or through the use of information generated by the ESF.
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CEO EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 237
later approval by the board of directors. The ESF may act as the go-between in
these negotiations to insure that they go smoothly and are quickly resolved.
Afterthe final term sheet is completed, both parties to the agreement will
generally have their counsel negotiate the language and legal terms of the
employment contract. 8 The company may choose to use inside counsel, or, in
some cases, the company's outside lawyers, to handle the legal part of the
negotiations. The executive will always retain an independent lawyer to handle
the drafting or revising of any agreement. The language of the contract that
ultimately comes out of this process, as in any negotiation, will reflect the
relative bargaining strength of the parties, although some parts of the contract
will be more heavily negotiated than others.
The company normally produces the initial draft of the contract, which can
give it a significant advantage in the ensuing negotiations. The reason for
giving the company this position is that these contracts become public
information, which gives the company a strong interest in ensuring that it does
not establish unfavorable future precedents in its negotiations with other
employees or future CEOs. As a result, it can generally insist on having the
right to prepare the initial draft. A potential CEO will prepare the initial
contract only in instances where he or she has extraordinary negotiating power.
As soon as the lawyers sit down to the bargaining table to negotiate the
contract's language, they begin the process of filling in the details not covered
by the term sheet or oral substantive agreement. While details of the economic
terms can be very important in these negotiations,9 our focus is on the legal
terms of the contract. In particular, our concerns are with the definitions of
"just cause" and of "good reason," the arbitration provisions, any non-compete
clauses, and any contractual restrictions on the use of derivative transactions
relating to stock options. Remembering that every negotiation is different and
that many of these terms are the subject of give-and-take between the parties,
we offer the few generalizations gleaned from our sources.
First, as a general matter, incumbent CEOs generally have stronger
negotiating positions than incoming CEOs for many reasons, including, most
obviously, that they have already experienced some degree of success in
8. In some cases, the term sheet is not used, and the parties go right to the contract
negotiations as the first written expression of the proposed deal. However, the main economic
terms have been agreed to orally prior to the drafting and the remainder of the process is very
similar to that which occurs in situations where a term sheet is used.
9. For example, the principals may agree to a two year severance package without
specifying what compensation payments and benefits are to be continued during that time
period. From the executive's perspective, it is important that the contract cover not only salary
payments, but also potential bonus payments (and their computation), stock option vesting,
benefits, and other potential continuing financial support.
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running the company and have an ongoing relationship with the incumbent
board of directors. There are two types of incoming CEOs: inside officers that
have been promoted, and executives brought in from outside of the company.
Between these two types, outsiders normally have more leverage in their
negotiations than candidates promoted from within the company. These
differences in negotiating strength significantly affect both the economic terms
and the key legal components of the final contract.
The final terms depend on both the relative bargaining power of the parties
and the importance of the clause. For example, executive terminations can be
for cause or without cause. For-cause terminations normally hurt the
executive's finances and reputation. Thus, executives are very concerned that
they not be unjustifiably, or subjectively, fired for cause. In negotiations over
the definition of "cause," however, there is normally little difficulty. Rarely are
CEOs fired for cause. The exceptions arise out of situations involving flagrant
abuses, such as blatant sexual harassment cases. Even if the contract's initial
draft defines cause in a subjective manner, it is relatively easy for an
executive's counsel to limit it to definite and specific instances of clear
wrongdoing.
Executives can also choose to leave their job for another employer or to
retire. Voluntary quitting can either be for good reason or without good reason.
Voluntary terminations without good reason usually carry financial penalties for
the executive, so executives want to have as broad a definition of "good reason"
as possible. Companies, of course, have exactly the opposite perspective and
want to limit good reason to a narrow set of circumstances to avoid having their
CEOs leave easily for alternative employment. This can lead to hard
bargaining over, for example, what constitutes a diminution of duties or
responsibilities that could trigger a good-reason departure.
Both parties to a CEO employment contract frequently view arbitration
clauses as desirable. Companies universally want to arbitrate disputes to keep
matters private, and thereby avoid adverse publicity over a messy termination
and possible public litigation. Normally, employees would want to preserve
their right to ajury trial (but for the greater expense) because they calculate that
a jury of their peers would be more sympathetic to their situation than to the
company firing them. However, CEOs may have good reason to believe that
juries will not identify with their compensation demands because the amounts
involved may seem excessive to most members of the public. This may lead
executives to favor arbitration generally, although they will still carefully
negotiate such things as the selection process for the arbitrators and their right
to appeal from an adverse decision.
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Both parties hotly negotiate non-compete clauses. Companies are
extremely sensitive to the potential for CEOs to walk away from the firm with
its secrets in their heads and then work for competitors. Executives, on the
other hand, do not want to be forced into long periods of unemployment in the
area where they have been most successful. The parties must reconcile these
competing interests, and the end result often reflects the company's willingness
to offer extended periods of severance payments and judicial decisions limiting
the enforceability of strong non-compete agreements.
Finally, we asked our sources about contractual limitations on executives'
use of derivative security transactions for their stock options. Here, the
company's board should be concerned about CEOs trying to enter into
agreements to hedge the risk of their stock options dropping in value.
Companies award options to executives as pay-for-performance and design the
options to become valuable only if the company's stock price at the time they
become exercisable exceeds the exercise price at which they were granted
(almost always the current market price at the time they were issued). If CEOs
can enter into a hedging transaction when they are granted the options that
insures that they will receive a positive risk-free return on the options
irrespective of how the company's stock price fares, then this destroys the
incentives that the options should produce. Our sources said, however, that
companies almost never request restrictions on hedging options.
Before turning to our discussion of the data, we should emphasize some of
its limitations. First, because we cannot directly observe the negotiations that
take place between boards and CEOs, we lack any direct measure of their
respective negotiating strength. All we can observe is the outcomes of
negotiations.
Second, we do not know what should be contained in an ideal CEO
employment contract. Parties negotiate contracts against the background of
existing U.S. laws, norms, and corporate governance practices, among other
things. To the extent that our system creates a certain level of background
negotiating strength for CEOs, perhaps because of American firms' board
structure, or U.S. corporate law's limitations on shareholders' power to
nominate directors, these contracts may not be negotiated on a completely level
playing field. 10
What we are able to observe is how much these contracts deviate from the
average contract in our database. This allows us to make statements about the
10. See Core et al., supra note 2, at 1145 (describing the arm's-length bargaining model).
This does not mean that the contracts are not optimal given the underlying corporate governance
system.
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relative strength of different types of provisions across our sample. Coupled
with some general information about what CEOs want and what firms want,
discussed above, this gives us some basis to draw conclusions about particular
clauses. Even here though, we must be cautious, as these negotiations cover all
aspects of the employment relationship, and one party may concede something
in one area of the contract in order to obtain concessions on other terms more
important to that party.
With this description of the process by which these contracts are
negotiated as background, we turn next to an explanation of our data.
III. Description of the Data
A. Source of Data
We obtained our initial data set from The Corporate Library, an
information clearing house formed in 1999 by Nell Minow and Robert
Monks." They compiled their database by contacting every company in the
S&P 500, the S&P Midcap 400, and the S&P Small Cap 600,12 and asking
them to provide a copy of their CEO's employment contract. These contracts
are public information as they are filed with the SEC as an exhibit to these
companies' proxy statements. However, it is difficult to obtain copies because
they are not included in the proxy statement sent to shareholders. Even getting
them from the SEC's public documents room is difficult because it requires that
the researcher know the filing date of the proxy materials in order for the SEC's
staff to locate them. They are, however, available through the SEC's EDGAR
database.
After several rounds of requests, the Corporate Library received replies
from a total of 865 of these companies. Of the responding companies, 548
(63.7%) provided documents they claimed to be their CEO's employment
contract, while the remaining 317 companies (36.3%) replied that their CEOs
11. The Corporate Library was previously named LENS Library, LLC, and was part of
LENS Investment Management. It subsequently separated from LENS and changed its name.
LENS Investment Management is an activist investment fund that seeks, among other things, to
reform the corporate governance practices of its portfolio companies. Jeff Benjamin, Rebellion
Pays for a Newly Focused Lens; Company Plans to Offer Itself as Activist For Hire, INV. NEWS,
Jun. 19, 2000, at 6. See generally, The Corporate Library, http:llwww. thecorporatelibrary.com/
(last visited Jan. 14, 2006); Lens Library, http://www.lens-library.com/ (last visited Jan. 14,
2006); Lens, Inc., http://www.lens-inc.com/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
12. Because of the time period of their survey, and the resultant movements in and out of
the top 1500 companies because of things like mergers and acquisitions, the total number of
companies that could be included in their database is 1632.
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did not have employment contracts. When we examined the documents,
however, we found that about one-third of them were not employment contracts
at all, but rather a mix of change-in-control agreements, employment contracts
for other employees, stock option plans, or miscellaneous unrelated documents.
Our initial reaction was astonishment that over one-third of CEOs did not
have written employment contracts. We decided that we needed to investigate
this information further, and so we purchased a subscription to LIVEDGAR, an
online database that provides access to all SEC filings. For our purposes,
LIVEDGAR has the great advantage of containing not only the main
documents filed with the SEC, such as every registered company's Form 10-K,
but also the attachments to those documents, which should include any
employment contracts that they have with their top executives. We searched
this database for the employment contracts for each of the companies that told
The Corporate Library that they did not have any such agreements.
In the course of this search, we uncovered an additional eighty CEO
employment contracts from companies that had told the Corporate Library that
their CEO had no such contract. Furthermore, we found that the vast majority
of the other CEOs had at least some other contractual agreement relating
directly to their employment with their company. The most common examples
of these contracts include severance (or termination) agreements, change-in-
control agreements, consulting agreements, and non-competition agreements.
In addition, there were a host of compensation-related agreements for many
executives, such as deferred compensation agreements, stock option plans, and
long term incentive plans. With the exception of the change-in-control
agreements, we did not include these other documents in our sample.
Many contractual protections for CEOs are not contained in employment
contracts, but rather in different contractual agreements. These different
contracts' coverage overlap with the more traditional notion of an employment
contract and make it hard to draw strong implications from the absence of an
"employment contract" for the remaining firms that claimed their CEO had no
employment contract. We should also note that the SEC does not monitor
whether companies file their CEO employment agreements with their Form 10-
Ks. It is therefore possible that some of the firms that told The Corporate
Library that they did not have such agreements also choose not to make them
publicly available.
In any event, the fact that so many CEOs have contractual protections, in
the form of employment contracts or in other ways, suggests that they are quite
different from other employees. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many,
perhaps even most, employees do not work with a formal, written contract.
While many countries require employment contracts to be in writing with
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specific provisions outlining pay, job duties, and other similar terms, American
law does not.
To pursue the issue of what constitutes a CEO contract, we analyzed the
documents that corporations gave to The Corporate Library. As we noted
above, not all of those act as employment agreements. 13 We decided to limit
our analysis to two categories of documents: employment contracts and
change-in-control agreements.14 Our reasons for examining the employment
agreements are obvious, but the decision to examine the change-in-control
agreements requires a bit more explanation.
Change-in-control agreements function as severance contracts in a sale
situation. Among other things, they are designed to protect executives' firm-
specific investments from expropriation if the executive is terminated
involuntarily by the acquirer in an unwanted takeover. 15 The CEO and the
target company's board normally negotiate these agreements before any
announced takeover bid for the firm. However, an acquirer will at least initially
bear the cost of these agreements. This potentially reduces the board's
incentives to bargain hard over the terms of these agreements. 16 We therefore
anticipate that some of their provisions may be more generous to CEOs than
those contained in employment contracts.
Of the 496 documents in our sample, 75.6% (375) were CEO employment
contracts and 24.4% (121) were change-in-control agreements. We examine
the employment contracts in Part IV, and then in Part V we compare the terms
of the change-in-control agreements with those in the employment agreements.
13. It is illustrative of the overlapping functions of these agreements that so many
corporations produced documents other than employment agreements in response to the request
from The Corporate Library.
14. We had initially compiled an additional sample of sixty-nine amendments to CEO
employment agreements. However, our preliminary analysis showed that they often
incorporated by reference terms from earlier employment contracts. This made it difficult to
compare their provisions with those in the regular employment contracts. We therefore decided
to postpone further analysis of these agreements.
15. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate
Web, 85 MICH. L. REv. 10, 75-77 (1986) (discussing the effect of a change in control agreement
on the risks associated with deferred compensation).
16. We recognize that a sophisticated acquirer may reduce the amount it is willing to pay
for the target to take into account these additional costs. To the extent that the target company
board is aware of this fact, they may be knowingly giving departing managers shareholders'
money.
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B. Description of the Variables
17
With the help of several research assistants, we read each of these
contracts and gathered information from them on over twenty-five variables.
18
We also collected information on firm size, including measures of market
capitalization and number of employees, and four digit Standard Industry
Codes (SIC) for each company. Part V uses this information to make cross
industry and firm size comparisons on the use of different contractual terms.
From the contracts, we obtained data on the starting date of the contract,
the length of the contract, the initial base salary provided for in the contract,
whether the contract contained any provisions concerning the payment of
bonuses to the CEO, whether the contract referred to stock option plans, and
whether the contract mentioned other long-term incentive plans in which the
CEO would participate. We used this information to determine whether the
contract covered each of the basic forms of executive compensation and for
what period of time. 19 We also collected information on other perquisites
expressly granted to the executive as part of the contract, including cars,
personal use of corporate aircraft, country club memberships, financial
planning services, supplemental insurance policies, and loans.
We then looked at several different legal provisions in these contracts.
First, we ascertained whether each contract contained a non-competition
provision. These provisions restrict an executive's ability to move to a rival
firm.20 Where such provisions existed, we then determined the duration of the
non-competition provision and the types of terminations that would activate
these restrictions.2'
17. The following discussion relates to both the employment contracts and the change-in-
control agreements. However, the change-in-control agreements did not contain all of the types
of information that are discussed in the text.
18. See infra Part VII, Basic Data Appendix (summarizing data).
19. We did not attempt to quantify the size of the CEO's compensation package because
that is not the focus of our current research, although we note that several commercial databases
do contain this information and we could easily add it into our data set. For example,
ExecuComp provides information on the value of each of these components for individual
companies for the time period of the contracts included in our sample.
20. Some evidence exists that these provisions are becoming more common in executive
employment contracts. See Rachel E. Silverman, The Jungle, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2000, at B 16
(reporting that in 1998 only 38% of executive employment contracts contained these provisions,
whereas by 2000 roughly 70% of these contracts included these restrictions).
21. We included separate codes to cover five alternative situations: for any termination,
any termination by the company, terminations by the company for cause only, any termination
by the executive, or terminations by the executive without good reason only.
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Next, we saw whether the contract required the parties to arbitrate their
disputes. Third, we collected information on any contractual restrictions on sales,
hedging, or pledging of stock options. Fourth, we looked to see if the contracts
included change-in-control provisions that would grant the executive greater
rights if a change in control of the company occurred.
Finally, we determined if each contract contained provisions for terminating
the executive for "just cause," or for permitting the executive to terminate the
contract for "good reason." In situations where the contract contained "just
cause" provisions, we looked at how the contract defined "just cause. ,22 We then
performed a similar analysis for an executive's right to terminate the contract for
good reason and asked first if the contract contained such provisions and then
how it defined "good reason. ,23 We also determined if the contract required the
executive to give notice when terminating the contract, and if so, how long.
C. The Sample
The firms in our sample are S&P 1500 corporations. They come from the
gamut of industries. The most prevalent are manufacturing firms (37.07% of our
sample), including such well-known firms as Phillip Morris, General Electric, and
Hewlett-Packard, and firms in transportation, communications, electricity, and gas
(13.07%), such as Consolidated Edison, Sprint, and American Airlines. The
largest employer in our sample, IBM, employs 316,303 workers, while
Remington Oil and Gas employs only twenty (with market capitalizations of
$158.65 billion and $67 million, respectively). Their mean market capitalization
is $5.57 billion, with a minimum of $21 million and a maximum of $164.77
billion.
Our average CEO earns a base salary of $643,212. The CEO of Mirage
Resorts in the services industry earns the most, at $2.5 million. This is more than
twenty-five times the salary of the lowest-paid CEO in our sample. Mean total
compensation is $1.65 million. The CEO of El Paso Corporation leads the way at
$11.24 million. As expected, larger firms pay their CEOs more. We find that a
ten percent increase in the number of a firm's employees correlates with a 1.8%
rise in CEO salary.24
22. We included separate codes for six different alternative definitions. These were
willful misconduct, gross misconduct, incompetence, moral turpitude, conduct not in a good
faith belief that it served the company (breach of fiduciary duty), and failure to perform stated
duties with notice and board approval.
23. We included three variations of this definition: failure to compensate, assignment of
duties inconsistent with the executive's position, and relocation.
24. This result corresponds to the elasticity of salary to number of employees estimated
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In addition to salary, the vast bulk of the contracts also describe bonuses
(90.13%), and over half mention long-term incentive plans (68.80%). Only
seventeen CEOs in our sample have neither a bonus nor a long-term incentive
plan mentioned in their contract, while 238 mention both.
Our contracts and change-in-control agreements span a number of years.
Table 1 shows that the start dates of the contracts begin in 1984 and continue to
2003. The vast bulk of them, however, are from the late 1990s.































































with a regression of the natural logarithm of salary on the natural logarithm of number of
employees. The elasticity parameter is found to be statistically significant at a better than 1%
level.
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IV. Employment Law Characteristics of CEO Contracts
The CEO is an employee of the corporation, albeit at the top of the
hierarchy. As with all private-sector nonunion employees in the United States,
the default presumption is that the CEO is employed at-will. In his well-known
defense of employment at-will, Richard Epstein has emphasized that the default
at-will contract applies from the CEO to the janitor of the corporation. 25 This
range of application of the at-will contract, Epstein argues, shows its flexibility
and utility. If CEOs, with all their bargaining power, accept the at-will
relationship, it cannot be true that at-will is a harsh construct thrust on oppressed
workers because of their lack of bargaining power.26
A. Termination Clauses in CEO Contracts
In an effort to determine whether CEOs are at-will employees, we paid
particular attention to the standard of termination in the CEO contracts. Overall,
we find that, overwhelmingly, the CEO contracts around the at-will default in one
way or another. This evidence casts doubt on the factual premise of the Epstein
argument that CEOs, like other employees, 27 are governed by the at-will standard.
To complete the point that CEOs differ from the at-will status of other
employees, we need to establish that these contracts are more than simply a fancy
version of at-will contracts. It is surprisingly tricky to determine whether a CEO
is employed at-will or can only be terminated for cause. In these contracts, at-will
and "just cause" are not completely polar concepts. Three issues are intertwined.
First is whether the contract lasts for a specific length of time (the so-called
"definite term" contract) or for an indefinite time. The at-will presumption
25. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947,
977 (1984) (noting that proposed reforms to at-will contracts would cover "the whole range
from senior executives to manual labor").
26. For arguments of the harshness of the at-will employment relationship, emphasizing
the lack of employee bargaining power as an explanation for why workers accept it, see
generally Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 CoLuM. L. REv. 1404, 1405 (1967); Cornelius Peck,
Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OmO ST. L. 1, 6
(1979); Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Timc for a
Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481, 483 (1976).
27. In an empirical survey of employment contracts of rank-and-file workers, Rip
Verkerke has found that 52% contract explicitly for an at-will relationship (affirming the default
presumption), while 15% explicitly contract for a just-cause dismissal standard. See J. Hoult
Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: Resolving the
Just Cause Debate, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 838, 867. Our findings for CEO contracts are strikingly
different.
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applies only to indefinite term contracts.28 Second is whether the contract uses
the words "at-will" or "just cause" or their equivalents, and how the contract
defines these terms. Third is the remedy issue: Is a CEO fired without cause
entitled to greater damages than if he or she were fired with cause?
In our sample, the bulk of contracts are for a definite term. Table 2 shows
the range of contract lengths for our employment contracts. We find that the most
common length is three years, with 128 out of 375 (34.13%) contracts falling in
this category. Five years is the next most common length with eighty-six out of
the 375 contracts in our sample running for this period of time (suggesting that
the Stalinist idea of a five-year plan has some currency among S&P 1500
companies). Only eleven contracts do not include a term of any type in them,
while another thirty-three say that they last until the CEO is terminated. Under
standard employment law, a definite-term contract is not an at-will contract
because dismissing the employee during the term would breach the contract
(unless the company could show the employee breached his or her duty of
loyalty). Thus, the vast majority of CEO contracts in our sample are not at-will
but rather are definite term, contrary to the speculation of many.
Table 2: Length of CEO Contracts
Contract Length (Years) # of Contracts % of All Contracts
Length not mentioned 11 2.93%
Until CEO is terminated 33 8.80%
Until CEO is 60-65 5 1.33%
Length = 1 19 5.07%
1 < Length < 2 36 9.60%
2 < Length < 3 7 1.87%
Length = 3 128 34.13%
3 < Length < 4 24 6.40%
4 < Length < 5 4 1.07%
Length = 5 86 22.93%
Length > 5 22 5.87%
Total: 375 100.00%
28. For support for the proposition that at-will contracts arise from indefinite hirings, see
the classic statement of the at-will rule by Horace G. Wood, MASTER AND SERVANT 272 (1877)
("With us [in America, unlike in England] the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite
hiring is primafacie a hiring at will."). Horace Wood is often accused of inventing the at-will
rules. See, e.g., Theodore J. St. Antoine, You're Fired!, 10 HuM. RTs. 32, 33 (1982)
(suggesting that the at-will rule sprang "full-blown in 1877 from [Wood's] busy and perhaps
careless pen").
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In addition to determining whether the contracts were definite-term or
indefinite-term, we also looked at whether the employment contracts
directly addressed the at-will issue. Only twenty-five of these contracts
expressly declare that the relationship was at-will, a shockingly low
number. 29 Another thirteen employment contracts, although not using the
words "at-will," give no greater rights to a CEO dismissed without cause
than to one for cause. The overwhelming bulk of CEO contracts (340) are
just-cause contracts in the sense that the CEO gets greater rights if he or
she is dismissed without cause.30
Why do contracts protect the CEO from arbitrary firings? The reason
is presumably because the value to the CEO of just-cause protection
exceeds the cost to the firm. Part of the harm to the CEO in being fired is
reputational. Other firms will be reluctant to hire a CEO who has been
fired because if the CEO did not work out in the old firm, he or she may
not work out in the new firm either. If fired without cause, the CEO gets
extra compensation. If the extra compensation is appropriately calibrated,
this encourages the CEO to act sufficiently diligently to avoid being fired
for cause and thus increases the CEO's effort.
The contractual definition of "just cause" is important in aligning
incentives. As Table 3 shows, for the employment contracts in our sample,
willful misconduct (259 out of 375), moral turpitude (271 out of 375), and
failure to perform duties (217 out of 375) were the most common
contractual bases for firing a CEO for cause. Less common, but still
important defined terms, included breach of fiduciary duties (190 out of
375) and gross misconduct (147 out of 375).
29. In twenty-four of these twenty-five contracts that claim to be at-will, termination with
cause has adverse financial consequences (zero severance payment versus substantial severance
payments if the executive is terminated without cause). In addition, twelve of these twenty-five
contracts are definite-term contracts.
30. Twenty-two contracts do not define severance payments due to termination either with
or without cause, so they cannot be compared.
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Table 3: Actions Defined as Just Cause for CEO Termination
# of % of All
Action Contracts Contracts
Not mentioned 9 2.40%
Mentioned but not specified 17 4.53%
Fiduciary breach 190 50.67%
Willful misconduct 259 69.07%
Gross misconduct 147 39.20%
Incompetence 13 3.47%
Moral turpitude 271 72.27%
Failure to perform duties 217 57.87%
Substance abuse 18 4.80%
Sexual harassment 2 0.53%
These figures are of tangential relevance to the Clinton impeachment
hearings, where it was often asserted that a CEO in the private sector would be
terminated for sexual dalliances. Assuming that such conduct constitutes moral
turpitude, we find that 72.27% 31 of all our contracts would allow such a firing.
However, our sample contains just two contracts that expressly say the CEO
can be fired for sexual harassment. In a related vein, only eighteen of our
contracts include substance abuse as a ground for just-cause termination.
Poor performance on the job does not constitute cause in most CEO
contracts. We find that only thirteen of our contracts define incompetence as a
reason for a just-cause termination. While extreme forms of incompetence
could fall within other defined categories of cause, such as failure to perform
duties, it seems odd that incompetence is not specifically listed as grounds for
just-cause termination in many contracts. Furthermore, as corporate law
scholars, we find it interesting that executives who breach their fiduciary duties
to the firm are only subject to termination for cause in roughly half of these
contracts.32 Our expectation had been that every company would view such
breaches as just cause for termination.
31. The 271 contracts allowing a moral-turpitude firing plus the only one at-will contract
that does not specify just-cause actions (which would also allow a moral-turpitude firing) are
72.53% of our total sample of 375 contracts.
32. Even those agreements that define a breach of fiduciary duties as grounds for a just
cause termination are frequently subject to important caveats. For example, ADC
Telecommunication's 2003 employment contract with its CEO Robert Switz states that a breach
of fiduciary duties constitutes grounds for just cause termination only if Switz does not have a
"reasonable good faith belief' that he was acting in the company's best interests.
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Table 4 shows the dramatic impact on a CEO's compensation if he or she
is fired with cause. Overwhelmingly, termination with cause means that a CEO
leaves the company without any severance payments.
Table 4: Salary Payments When CEO is Fired With Cause
33
# of % of All
Payment in Terms of Base Salary Contracts Contracts
CEO pays company 1 0.27%
Not mentioned in contract 14 3.73%
Mentioned but not specified 2 0.53%
Minimum of (balance of term, 3 years) 1 0.27%
Payment = 0 346 92.27%
Payment = 1 month salary 3 0.80%
Payment = 3 months salary 1 0.27%
Payment = 1 year salary 3 0.80%
Payment = 2 years salary 2 0.53%
Payment = 3 years salary 2 0.53%
Total: 375 100.00%
Turning to the question of how much notice the firm must give its CEO of
his or her termination, we find that out of the 375 contracts, 299 require the
firm to give a specific notice period before terminating a CEO's employment
either with or without just cause. If the firm fires its CEO with just cause, the
mean notice period is 11.95 days, with a median of 0 days, although the
contracts range from zero to sixty days. The notice period is generally longer
when the firm fires the CEO without just cause. In this situation, the average
notice period is 28.77 days, with a median of thirty days, varying from zero to
360 days.
A related issue on CEO termination is what compensation the contract
gives if a CEO is fired without cause. As Table 5 shows, most employment
contracts call for some multiple of current salary to be paid to a CEO who is
fired without cause. This is in stark contrast to what happens in a for-cause
termination.
33. We have not included any bonus payments that would be paid out as part of a
severance package.
250
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CEO EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 251
Table 5: Payments When CEO is Fired Without Cause
3 4
Payment in Terms of Base Salary # of Contracts % of All Contracts
Not mentioned 18 4.80%
Mentioned but not specified 3 0.80%
Lump sum for balance of term 23 6.13%
Salary continues for balance of term 51 13.60%
Payment = 0 7 1.87%
0 < Payment < 1 year salary 8 2.13%
Payment = 1 year salary 30 8.00%
1 year < Payment < 2 years salary 9 2.40%
Payment = 2 years salary 109 29.07%
2 years < Payment < 3 years salary 11 2.93%
Payment = 3 years salary 77 20.53%
Payment > 3 years salary 10 2.67%
Total: 356 94.93%
Note: Of our total sample of 375 regular contracts, we are excluding 19 with
positive severance payments which are difficult to classify.
Two years' salary is the most common contractual award (109) for
terminations without cause. There are also a significant number of contracts
that provide for one year's salary (30) and three years' salary (77). A large
number of employment contracts state that the CEO will have his or her salary
continue for the balance of the term of the contract if terminated (51), while
another substantial group provides that the CEO gets a lump sum payment
equal to the amount of salary that he or she would receive over the remainder of
the contract (23) .
34. We have not included any bonus payments that would be paid out as part of a
severance package.
35. There are a number of other variations on how contracts calculate the CEO's salary
severance package in a termination without cause. For example, one contract awards the
departing CEO four times the amount of salary due for the remainder of the contract. Some
contracts pay the CEO a lump sum equal to the maximum of one or two times the salary or the
amount of the salary owed for the remainder of the contract. As there are relatively few of these
contracts in the sample, we do not report them in the table.
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Finally, in Table 6, we compare the severance salary payments that CEOs
receive when they are fired with cause versus those that they receive when fired
without cause. The latter payments are almost always greater.
Table 6: Comparison Between Salary Payments When CEO Is
Fired With and Without Cause
Salary Not Without With and Total
Payments Possible Cause Are Without
When CEO To Greater Cause Are
Is Fired With Comnare the Same
Cause
CEO pays
company 0 1 0 1
Not
mentioned in
contract 14 0 0 14
Mentioned
but not




3 years) 0 0 1 1
Payment = 0 6 333 7 346
Payment = 1
month salary 0 3 0 3
Payment = 3
months salary 0 1 0 1
Payment = 1
year salary 0 2 1 3
Payment = 2
years salary 0 0 2 2
Payment = 3
years salary 0 0 2 2
Total: 22 340 13 375
The flip side of the CEO being fired is the CEO quitting. As Table 7
shows, 293 contracts explicitly allow the CEO to quit for a good reason,
suggesting that the CEO breaches the contract by quitting for a bad reason. As
..... K-----
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with other provisions in the CEO contract, CEO contracts on this quitting point
operate differently than contracts for rank-and-file workers. The standard or
default rule is that workers in an indefinite-term contract can quit at any time
for any reason. Most CEOs appear to give up some of this freedom to quit at
will and will breach the contract if they quit without a good reason.
Table 7: Can the CEO Terminate the Contract for Good Reason?
Good Reason # of Contracts % of All Contracts
Not mentioned 82 21.87%
Mentioned but not specified 18 4.80%
Mentioned and specified 275 73.33%
Total: 375 100.00%
In defining "good reason" for when a CEO can quit, most contracts allow
the CEO to quit if any one of three criteria is met: the CEO's assigned duties
are inconsistent with the position (253); the company fails to compensate the
CEO according to their agreement (209); or the company relocates the CEO to
a different geographic location (186). A number of contracts include a variety
of other defined terms as to what constitutes good reason, too. However, a
significant percentage of the employment contracts do not mention terminations
for good reason (82), while a smaller group mentions termination for good
reason but leave the term undefined (18).
Table 8: Actions Defined as Grounds for CEO Quitting With Good
Reason
# of % of All
Action Contracts Contracts
Not mentioned 82 21.87%
Mentioned but not specified 18 4.80%
Duties inconsistent with CEO position 253 67.47%
Relocation 186 49.60%
Failure to compensate 209 55.73%
Other 216 57.60%
Only 266 contracts require the CEO to give notice a specific period before
quitting either with or without good reason. If the CEO quits for a good reason,
the mean notice period is 28.50 days, although the contracts range from zero to
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180 days. The notice period is sometimes longer if the CEO quits voluntarily
(i.e., without good reason). In this situation, the average notice period is 45.32
days, varying from zero to 360 days. However, the median notice period is
thirty days for both situations.
Based on our examination of the contracts, we find that CEOs terminated
for good reason generally get the same severance payments as when they are
fired without cause. Similarly, although we have not expressly quantified the
effect on CEO severance pay of quitting for good reason versus quitting
without good reason, our review of the contracts shows that it is similar to the
36differences for termination without cause versus termination with cause.
B. Noncompetition Clauses
One of the major issues in a CEO contract is whether the CEO can
continue working in the industry after leaving the particular company. From
the company's perspective, it does not want a CEO to learn its strengths and
weaknesses and then go to work for a competitor and exploit that inside
knowledge. From the CEO's perspective, the CEO does not want to be trapped
in a particular company if another firm can better use (and compensate) his or
her expertise in the industry.
In our sample of CEO contracts, about one-third (122 out of 375) do not
have explicit Do-Not-Compete (DNC) clauses. As Table 9 shows, for the
remaining 253 contracts (about two-thirds of the total), the most common time
restriction is two years (118). Other common lengths for Do-Not-Compete
clauses are one year (80) and three years (29). Only ten contracts restrict the
36. We also note that an important number of contracts have indemnification clauses that
provide CEOs with contractual rights to have the company pay their expenses in the event that
they are sued in connection with their current or past relationship with the company. For
example, clause eleven of Clear Channel Communications' CEO's contract provides:
Executive shall be indemnified and held harmless by the Company to the fullest
extent authorized by Texas law, as the same exists or may hereafter be amended,
against all Expenses incurred or suffered by Executive in connection therewith, and
such indemnification shall continue as to Executive even if Executive has ceased to
be an officer, director, trustee or agent, or is no longer employed by the Company
and shall inure to the benefit of his heirs, executors and administrators.
Contracts may also require the company to purchase liability insurance to provide some
coverage for the CEO in case of a lawsuit. For example clause nine of Hewlett-Packard's
CEO's contract provides: "The Company shall cover Executive under directors and officers'
liability insurance both during and, while potential liability exists, after the Employment Term
in the same amount and to the same extent, if any, as the Company covers its other officers and
directors."
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CEO from competing for four to five years, and no contract has a longer
restriction.
Table 9: Lengths of Non-Competition Period
DNC Length (Years) # of Contracts % of All Contracts
N/A, No DNC clause 122 32.53%








4.00 < Length < 5.00 10 2.67%
Total: 375 100.00%
As Table 10 shows, 180 of the 253 contracts that have Do-Not-Compete
clauses are triggered by any termination, regardless of whether the CEO quits
or the company fires the CEO, with or without cause. Rank-and-file employees
often complain, sometimes successfully, when they are forbidden from
competing after being fired by the company, arguing they did not choose to
leave the company.37 A few CEO contracts address this concern. Twenty-one
contracts trigger the non-competition clause when the CEO is fired for cause,
rather than fired for any reason. On the other side, twenty-four contracts trigger
non-competition clauses when the CEO quits without good reason, while only
three are triggered if the CEO quits with good reason and four are triggered any
time that the CEO quits. But these more nuanced clauses are a distinct minority
of the non-competition clauses we surveyed.
37. Compare Robert S. Weiss & Assoc. v. Wiederlight, 546 A.2d 216,221 (Conn. 1988)
("[T]he reasonableness of a restrictive covenant of employment does not turn on whether the
employee.., left his position voluntarily or was dismissed by the employer.") with Ma & Pa,
Inc. v. Kelly, 342 N.W.2d 500, 502 (Iowa 1984) (noting that dismissal is factor opposing
injunction), and Insulation Corp. of Am. v. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729, 738 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)
(refusing to enforce non-competition clause because employee fired for poor performance
cannot pose the same competitive threat as one who voluntarily joins another business).
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Table 10: Triggers for Do-Not-Compete Clause
# of % of All
Terminations Triggering DNC Contracts Contracts
N/A, No DNC clause 122 32.53%
Trigger not specified 0 0.00%
Any termination 180 48.00%
Any termination by firm 13 3.47%
Termination by firm without cause 5 1.33%
Termination by firm with cause only 21 5.60%
Any termination by CEO 4 1.07%
Voluntary termination by CEO without
good reason 24 6.40%
Termination by CEO with good reason 3 0.80%
During severance period 26 6.93%
We next test the hypothesis that in contracts including a non-
competition clause, contract length should be correlated with the length of
the severance payments set by the terms of the contract. The premise here
is that the two should be correlated because this ensures that the departing
executive is compensated for his or her period of forced unemployment.
Using the contracts with a specified non-competition period that also have
specified severance payments, we find little evidence to support this
hypothesis. The correlation between these two variables is low, just 0.11,
and statistically non-significant (N= 177, p-value=O. 146). However, Table
11 shows that of the 177 cases that exhibit both non-compete clauses and
severance payments, 149 (84.18%) have a severance payment that is equal
or greater than the length of the non-competition period. This suggests that
the executive is, on average, more than adequately compensated for his or
her forgone salary during this period of forced non-competition.
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Table 11: CEO Contracts by Length of Non-Competition Period and
Severance Payment
Severance Length of Non-Competition Period
Payment (Years)
(% of Base
Salary) 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 4 5 Total
0% 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 4
50% 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 3
60% 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
100% 1 10 1 5 0 2 0 2 21
150% 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 3
195% 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
200% 1 26 2 41 0 3 1 2 76
250% 0 2 0 3 1 1 0 0 7
260% 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
299% 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
300% 1 14 0 24 0 9 '0 2 50
400% 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
500% 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 5
600% 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
700% 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Total 3 57 8 84 1 16 1 7 177
C. Arbitration Clauses
Moving away from compensation issues, we find that 156 of the 375
(41.6%) CEO contracts include a clause agreeing to arbitrate rather than litigate
disputes. A hotly debated topic in employment law is whether the law should
allow employers to insist that their employment disputes be submitted to
binding arbitration rather than to a court. Many scholars fear that such
mandatory arbitration clauses are the result of coercive employers forcing them
on workers with little bargaining power. Our findings cast doubt on that
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assertion. Even CEOs, who are generally employees with considerable
bargaining power, seem willing to bind themselves to arbitrate contractual
disputes.
Arbitration clauses divide generally into two types: clauses that require
arbitration of all disputes between the parties and clauses that require
arbitration for all disputes except those related to noncompetition,
nonsolicitation, confidentiality, and intellectual property. In this second class
of clauses, the company considers that non-compliance by the executive with
these particular provisions would result in irreparable harm to the company's
interests. Frequently the company expressly reserves the right to seek
injunctive relief in a court or appropriate forum. In addition, many of these
clauses address the procedures to follow in the event of the need for arbitration:
how, when, and where to file the demand for arbitration; who will select the
arbitrators; and who pays the costs associated with it.
V. Corporate Law Issues
A. Competing Theories About CEO Contracting
Executive compensation is one of the hottest corporate governance issues
today.38 As public outrage over large pay packages grows and pressure to come
up with new checks on CEOs' pay becomes a frequent topic in editorial
columns, we read regular reports about the huge dollar amounts of the pay
packages and number of stock options awarded to corporate CEOs.3 9 Some
legal scholars have claimed that pay levels are artificially inflated because
corporate pay negotiations are not at arm's length but, rather, strongly biased in
executives' favor because executives have directors in their back pocket.n° On
the other side, other academics have defended existing compensation practices,
claiming that they reflect efficient contracting and arguing that only a few bad
apples need to be punished.41
38. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We've Been, How
We Got to Here, What the Problems Are, and How To Fix Them, Harvard Business School
NOM Research Paper No. 04-28 (July 12, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=561305
(surveying why these issues have become so important and how to analyze them).
39. For example, the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and several other news
services publish annual executive pay surveys that highlight pay increases and levels.
40. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 27 (arguing that because directors generally
have insufficient incentives to remain independent, they often are controlled by corporate
executives).
41. See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in HANDBOOK OF LABOR
ECONOMICS 2485, 2486-88 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999) (surveying the
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In a perfect world, we would be able to resolve this debate by observing
the actual negotiations that take place between incoming CEOs and boards of
directors to determine the relative negotiating strength of the two sides.
Instead, as we earlier noted, all we can examine is the outcome of their
negotiations as manifested by the size of the compensation package or terms of
their employment contract. In this section of the Article, we report more
information about the employment contracts, and we also try to infer some
further information about the negotiations that took place by looking at the
employment contracts' terms and comparing them to the terms of change-in-
control agreements.
B. Change-in-Control Agreements
Change-in-control agreements are negotiated to insure that the CEO will
have the appropriate incentives to do what is best for the company's
shareholders if the company becomes a takeover target. The change-in-control
agreement does this by insuring that, if a CEO is terminated after a takeover, he
or she receives payments equal to his or her forgone future compensation. In
theory, this should enable the CEO to determine whether to resist the takeover
based solely on his or her belief about what is best for the company's
shareholders. Importantly, however, an acquirer, at least initially, bears the cost
of change-in-control agreements, which may reduce the incentives of board
members to negotiate hard to keep these payments as low as possible.
To operationalize the protections of a double trigger change-in-control
agreement, the agreement must define the events that permit an executive to
terminate his or her own employment for good reason and thereby trigger the
severance payments provided for in the change-in-control agreement.42 Several
competing forces operate in the good reason, or constructive termination,
provisions in a change-in-control agreement. One important factor is that these
provisions may be much more easily triggered by a departing executive
because, in some sense, they represent the constructive termination arrangement
that the executive would like to have had in the first place but could not get
from any employer. From the employer's perspective, it can afford to draft
these provisions leniently because in the employer's view, they involve a future
buyer's money. In other words, these provisions will only become operative if
literature).
42. In single trigger change-of-control agreements, the executive can obtain these
severance benefits after a defined change of control even without a good reason termination.
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the company is sold to another company, and that buyer will be responsible for
paying the departing executive.
On the other hand, the current employer may care very much about these
provisions if it believes that being able to insure that the executive stays with
the new buyer will be an important "asset" in a sale. In this scenario, the
executive is a key asset of the business when it is sold, and so the board will not
want the executive to be able to walk out the door right after the sale. This
suggests that a company may want tight constructive termination provisions in
its CEO's change-in-control arrangement. Companies which have a significant
equity owner, such as a private equity fund portfolio company, would tend to
avoid hair-trigger constructive termination arrangements because those owners
know that without the executives in place, they are not going to get top dollar
for the business.
To compare our change of control agreements with our employment
contracts, we first eliminated from the sample all of those employment
contracts which also contained change of control provisions. We then analyzed
the resulting subset of contracts, which we call "pure" contracts to determine
how they defined "good reason." These results are presented in Table 12A
below.
Table 12A: Actions Constituting Good Reason in "Pure"
Regular Contracts
# of % of All
Action Contracts Contracts
Not mentioned in contract 38 35.85%
Mentioned but not specified 7 6.60%
Duties inconsistent w/CEO pos 51 48.11%
Relocation 33 31.13%
Failure to compensate 42 39.62%
Other 47 44.34%
Total: 106 100.00%
Table 12B below presents data on the 121 change-in-control agreements
in our sample.43 When we compare the values shown here with those contained
43. We should also note that 269 of our 375 employment contracts give CEOs greater
dismissal protections in the event of a change of control transaction. We have not separately
analyzed these provisions, although that may be a fruitful area for future research.
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in Table 12A above, we see that the change-in-control agreements are more
likely to include strong definitions of good reason terminations than regular
employment contracts. For example, only twenty out of 121 (16.53%) change-
in-control agreements fail to define or mention good reason terminations."4 In
contrast, forty-five out of 106 (42.45%) employment contracts do not contain
such language. For the 101 change-in-control agreements in our sample that do
define good reason, we find that a CEO can trigger a good reason termination if
he or she is assigned duties inconsistent with his or her prior position (99 out of
101); he or she is geographically relocated (89 out of 101); the company fails to
compensate him or her (97 out of 101); and a host of other reasons (78 out of
101). These proportions, except for the "mentioned but not specified" category
and the "other" category, were found to be statistically significantly higher than
for our sample of pure employment contracts.45
Table 12B: Actions Constituting Good Reason in Change-in-Control
Agreements
# of % of All
Action Agreements Agreements
Not mentioned 15 12.40%
Mentioned but not specified 5 4.13%
Duties inconsistent with CEO position 99 81.82%
Relocation 89 73.55%
Failure to compensate 97 80.17%
Other 78 64.46%
Another important issue concerning change-in-control agreements is
whether the departing executive is viewed as potentially dangerous if he or she
is able to compete (for example, because he or she knows secret processes or
customers). In this situation, current employers might trade strong constructive
termination arrangements for tighter and longer non-competition agreements.
This suggests that we should see strong do-not-compete provisions in change-
in-control agreements.
44. The bulk of these twenty agreements have provisions that are more favorable for
CEOs, including several that pay out benefits whenever a change of control occurs even if the
executive is not terminated, and others that pay benefits to the executive after a change of
control unless they are terminated for cause by the acquirer. This strengthens our main point
here-that CEOs get more protection in change-in-control agreements than in their employment
contracts.
45. Tests for differences in proportions were performed at a 1% significance level.
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Again, we present the data for the 106 pure employment contracts in our
sample. They show that the majority of such contracts contain do-not-compete
provisions, with one and two years being the most frequent length.
Table 13A: Lengths of Non-Competition Period for "Pure"
Regular Contracts
# of
DNC Length (Years) Contracts % of All Contracts









By contrast, the data in Table 13B show that the vast majority of change-
in-control agreements do not have such provisions: in ninety-one of our 121
change-in-control agreements, there is no do-not-compete clause. This is
particularly striking because only twenty-six of these 121 change-in-control
agreements are for executives that have employment agreements.46
Furthermore, even with those change-in-control agreements that do have do-
not-compete clauses, they appear to be shorter than those found in employment
contracts. Thus, the most common length of a do-not-compete clause in a
change-in-control agreement is one year, whereas with an employment
agreement the most common provision lasts for two years. We find that
66.04% of pure CEO employment contracts have do-not-compete clauses,
whereas only 24.79% of change-in-control agreements contain such clauses.
The difference between these two proportions is statistically significant at less
than the 5% level of significance. Again, we view this as evidence that CEOs
do not get everything they want in their employment contracts, and that boards
46. For the twenty-six CEOs with both agreements, only five of the employment contracts
have do-not-compete clauses: one that lasts one year, one that lasts two years, and three that last
three years.
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succeed in protecting the corporation's interests, at least to some extent, in
those negotiations.
Table 13B: Lengths of Non-Competition Period for Change-in-Control
Agreements
DNC Length (Years) # of Agreements % of All Agreements










An important zero-sum negotiation between employer and executive
regarding change-in-control arrangements is whether the executive gets
grossed-up for golden parachute excise taxes. A gross-up (the iterative
asymptotic calculation that keeps on taking into effect the incremental tax on
the incremental payment being made to an executive to compensate him for that
very tax) greatly increases the cost of the change-in-control payment to the
employer at the same time that it deprives the employer of the tax deduction on
those payments. We find that fifty-four of our 121 change-in-control
agreements provide for tax gross-ups for CEOs. As there is no analogous type
of surcharge on the basic forms of compensation provided for in CEO
employment contracts, we cannot draw any inferences about the parties'
bargaining strength from this fact.
C. Restrictions on Hedging or Pledging Stock Options
The literature on executive compensation debates whether corporate
executives can engage in hedging or pledging transactions for the stock options
that they hold.47 The issue is important because the fundamental rationale for
47. See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundations
of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440,465 (2000) ("Whereas existing contractual
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awarding managers large blocks of stock options is to align their interests with those
of corporate shareholders.48 Executives that hold large blocks of options have
incentives to get the company's stock price up so as to maximize the value of their
options. This encourages them to work harder and focus more clearly on
maximizing shareholder value. If these managers can use the derivatives market "to
trade stock options for fixed payment streams based on factors other than the
company's performance," 49 then the goals of performance-based compensation will
be seriously undermined.
Dean Schizer has claimed that executives are severely constrained in their
ability to engage in hedging or pledging of their stock options.50 He looks at two
types of potential contractual limitations on derivative transactions in stock options:
stock option restrictions and insider trading policies. He claims that a typical stock
option plan bars pledging of stock options, but not hedging of them.5' Firms that
have insider trading policies, on the other hand, usually do constrain hedging
transactions, according to Schizer, although not all firms have such policies.52 He
does not, however, discuss whether firms ever include such constraints in their
managers' employment contracts.
Our data set provides us with the ability to examine whether contracts
constrain executives from engaging in hedging or pledging of their stock options in
their employment agreements. We find that 271 of the 375 employment contracts
(72.27%) in our sample discussed the executive's stock option compensation; they
usually included references to the various incentive compensation plans offered by
the company to its executives. Of these 271 contracts, five restricted the executive's
sale of stock options. None of them restricted hedging of options. Only three
contracts restricted or prohibited the executive's ability to pledge options. However,
and securities law constraints are sufficient to block many instances of options hedging, they do
not provide a complete barrier."); Steven A. Bank, Devaluing Reform: The Derivatives Market
and Executive Compensation, 7 DEPAuL BuS. L.J. 301, 301 (1995) ("Executive compensation
has been the subject of a raging controversy in recent years."); Robert Dean Ellis, Equity
Derivatives, Executive Compensation, and Agency Costs, 35 Hous. L. REv. 399, 427 (1998)
("[T]he regulatory framework tends to address technical features of such instruments [as stock
options] rather than their potential misuse.").
48. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on
Stock Option Plans, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 31,37-38 (2000) (summarizing rationale for the
use of stock option plans).
49. Id. at 45.
50. Schizer, supra note 47, at 445-46. But see Bank, supra note 47, at 332 (concluding
that these constraints are not as severe as often claimed); Ellis, supra note 47, at 441 (same).
51. Schizer, supra note 47, at 460. This is consistent with our observations of various
stock option plans that are attached to some of our employment contracts.
52. See Schizer, supra note 47, at 460 (citing to his discussions with three particular law
firm partners and some investment bankers in support of this claim).
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one of these contracts is unusual in that the shares issued to the executive were
unregistered stock, and therefore subject to federal securities law's restrictions on its
resale under the 1933 Securities Act. These figures support the claim that companies
do little in executive employment contracts to restrict their executives' ability to
engage in derivative transactions with their stock options.
D. Perquisites
CEO perks are a hot topic in the popular press.5 3 In Table 14 we present some
summary statistics for some of the more common perquisites given to CEOs in their
employment contracts. We focus here on six of the more salient forms of perquisites:
automobiles54 (144 out of 375 contracts), country club memberships"5 (92 out of 375
contracts), personal use of the company's aircraft (27 out of 375 contracts), company-
paid travel for the CEO's spouse (20 out of 375 contracts), loans to the CEO (26 out of
375 contracts), and company-paid apartments for the CEO's personal use (8 out of
375 contracts). In addition, a large proportion of the contracts in our sample included
at least one of the following benefits: supplemental retirement plans (SERPs),
executive pensions, or financial counseling benefits (217 contracts).
Table 14: Perquisites Mentioned in CEO Contract
# of % of All
Type of Perquisite Contracts Contracts
Apartment 8 2.13%
Company aircraft 27 7.20%
Company car or car allowance 144 38.40%
Country/social club 92 24.53%
Loan of any kind 26 6.93%
Spouse travel 20 5.33%
SERP, Pension, or Financial advice 217 57.87%
53. See, e.g., Perks as Varied as Recipients; Firms Pick Up Tabs for Country Club, Even
Pay CEOs' Taxes, Hous. CHRON., May 12,2003, at B3; Tyson Serves CEO Bigger Portions of
Pay, Perks, Ci. TRIB., Jan. 3, 2003, at N2; Michael Skapinker, Perks That Go Too Far: CEOs
Are Paid More Than Enough-They Should Be Able to Buy Their Umbrella Stands, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 2002, at 18; James F. Peltz, For CEOs, It's a Lot Lonelier at the Top; Scandals: The
Pay and Perks Still are Lavish, but Many Executives Bristle at the Public's Scorn, L.A. TIMES,
Jul. 18, 2002, at 1; Carrie Johnson, As Perks Go, This One's a Gas; Workers Benefit From
CEO's Love Affair With Corvettes, WASH. POST., Jun. 1, 2001, at El.
54. Ten of these contracts also included a personal driver for the CEO.
55. An additional seven contracts provided fitness club memberships for the CEO.
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Theorists have interpreted perquisite consumption in different ways.
Professor Fama has argued that executives trade off perquisites for other forms
of compensation, so that CEOs receiving valuable benefits also take home
smaller paychecks.5 6 Under this theory, consumption of perquisites is an
agency cost only if not offset by reduced pay levels. Jensen and Meckling take
a more negative view and argue that perquisite consumption constitutes a
diversion of firm resources that results in a straight out reduction in firm
value.57 If we accept their view of perquisites, then the data in Table 14 could
represent pure agency costs. One recent paper has empirically tested these
theories using data on the personal use of corporate aircraft by CEOs, and
found some evidence supporting both views.
58
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the employment contracts and change-in-control
agreements for a large sample of CEOs of S&P 1500 companies. We find
evidence that CEOs have significant bargaining power in their negotiations
over the terms of their employment contracts and change-in-control agreements.
Furthermore, the differences between these CEO contracts and those of other
corporate workers seem quite stark. While more work needs to be done in
order to conclusively determine whether the negotiations between CEOs and
their boards are arm's length, or one sided, and what are all the differences
between CEO and rank-and-file employment arrangements, our data offer some
valuable insights into these questions and help to inform these ongoing debates.
56. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and The Theory of The Firm, 88 J. Pol. ECON. 288
(1980).
57. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 325-28 (1976).
58. David Yermack, Flights of Fancy: Corporate Jets, CEO Perquisites, and Inferior
Shareholder Returns, Unpublished Working Paper, September 2004 (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Market
Capitalization 373 5.575 15.532 0.021 164.773
(billion $)
Number of 371 18,340 36,452 20 316,303
Employees





Transportation, Communications, Electricity and 49 13%
Gas
Trade 46 12%




Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum MaximumContracts
Salary (as
time contract 370 643,212 309,829 90,000 2,500,000
signed)
Total
Compensation 359 1.649 1.510 0.125 11.244
(million $)
Variable # of Contracts % of All Contracts
Bonus Mentioned in Contract 338 90%
Long-Term Incentive Plan 258 69%
Mentioned in Contract




% of All Contracts
Arbitration Clause to Solve Disputes 156 42%
Definite Term Contracts 326 87%
Variable# of
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum MaximumContracts
Length of




Variable # of Contracts % of All Contracts
Do-Not-Compete Clause in 253 67%
Contract
# of Std





(Years) 252 1.86 0.89 0.25 5.00
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% of All Contracts
Change in Control Gives CEO Greater 269 72%
Rights/Compensation
CEO Can Be Dismissed For Just Cause 362 97%
Notice Firm Must Give BeforeNteinn CEOt fore Jusfe # of Contracts % of All ContractsTerminating CEO for Just Cause
Not mentioned 87 23%
Mentioned but days not specified 85 23%
Days in advance specified 203 54%
# of Std
Variable Median Mean Min MaxContracts Dev
Days of Notice Firm
Must Give Before
Terminating CEO 203 0 11.95 17.02 0 60
for Just Cause (if
specified)
Notice Firm Must Give Before
Terminating CEO Without # of Contracts % of All Contracts
Just Cause
Not mentioned 159 42%
Mentioned but days not specified 46 12%
Days in advance specified 170 45%




Before Terminating 170 30 28.77 40.96 0 360
CEO Without Just
Cause (if specified)
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Termination Provisions by CEO
Variable # of Contracts % of All Contracts
Explicit Clause Says CEO
Can Quit With Good 293 78%
Reason
Stock Option Clauses
# of % of All
Variable Contracts Contracts
CEO Gets Restricted Stock 114 30%
Stock Options Mentioned in Contract 271 72%
CEO Characteristics
# of Std
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum
Contracts Dev
CEO Age 369 54.50 6.90 36 77
270
